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issuance of process to require the attendance of witnesses within the state.? It is
therefore difficult to see why it should invalidate the provision of the uniform act. The
activities condemned as "unreasonable searches and seizures" are usually those which
compel a person to give evidence against himself.'8 Compulsory testimony which, when
given before a court which has jurisdiction of the witness, is not for any reason an "unreasonable search and seizure" should not be deemed such when the witness is compelled to testify outside the state.
Another ground assigned for the invalidity of the statute is the violation of the right
to free ingress and egress to and from the several states guaranteed by the privileges
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.'9
The witness is made to leave the state against his will and to go into another state
when he does not wish to. His privilege of going into any other state he desires is denied
him. If compulsory egress in the interest of the administration of justice does deny the
witness free egress and ingress into the state of his choice, it nevertheless is not an unjustifiable restraint. Every citizen attending a trial within the state is, to the same
extent, temporarily deprived of his right to leave the state at his will. The right of
free egress is suspended in favor of the paramount obligation of the individual to contribute to the administration of justice.
The last objection made is that the act deprives the witness of his liberty without
due process of law. The witness here, however, is afforded the protection of due process
to a greater extent than he would be if he were forced to testify within the state.'0
He is given an opportunity to be heard as to the materiality of his testimony and as
to his objections to the compulsory order before the subpoena issues. He will be compelled to attend only if it will not cause undue hardship and if the laws of the state in
which the prosecution or inquiry is pending and the states through which he must pass
in traveling will protect him from service of civil or criminal process. Finally, he is
fully reimbursedl and need travel no more than iooo miles.
Evidence-Hearsay-Admssibility of Docket of Justice of Peace-[Idaho].-The
defendant was charged with violating an Idaho statute' by writing a check with intent
to defraud. At the hearing before a justice of the peace, the defendant admitted writing the check. The justice thereupon entered a plea of guilty and sentenced the defendant to ninety days in jail. Upon appeal to the district court under a statute' au17Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1gI).
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thorizing trial de novo, the state introduced in evidence a copy of the justice's court
docket as a confession of guilt. The defendant's counsel failed to object to introduction of the docket or the method of its authentication, or to attempt to explain the circunstances surrounding the plea of guilty. Subsequently the defendant testified that
he had not actually pleaded guilty to the charge. He claimed, rather, that after admitting having written the check, he had attempted to deny the fraudulent intent,
only to be silenced by the justice, who recorded a plea of guilty. The jury found the
defendant guilty of the misdemeanor charged, and he was sentenced to six months in
jail. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Idaho the judgment of the district court was
affirmed, two justices dissenting. State v. Sedam.3
Although no objection was made by defendant's counsel to the introduction of the
docket as a confession of guilt, the dissenting opinions raise the problems of the admissibility, conclusiveness, and methods of authentication of such dockets. The docket
of a justice of the peace is usually admissible to evidence the proceedings in his court. 4
The justice is under a dutys statutory in this case, 6 to keep a docket of the cases before
his court, and the presumption favors the veracity of such dockets.7 These dockets are,
therefore, within the scope of the "official document" exception to the hearsay rule.8
In this case, however, the court might have hesitated to admit the docket had the
defendant's counsel made proper objection.9 Counsel could have contested whether
the defendant had in fact pleaded guilty and have claimed that the prejudice resulting
from the admission would over-balance the evidential weight.' o Very probably the
court would have ruled that the prejudice could be dissipated by permitting the defendant to explain away the admission, for the docket is not conclusive." The courts
take judicial notice that justices of the peace are, for the most part, not learned in the
law.2 Counsel could then, even assuming that the defendant did not deny his former
plea of guilty, have contended that his subsequent plea of not guilty acted to withdraw
it."s The majority of courts do not permit the prosecution to mention a former plea
of guilty which has been withdrawn, for the effect of the reference upon the jury would
negate the privilege of withdrawal.X4
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Had the defendant's counsel made proper objection and had the court ruled the
plea of guilty inadmissible, the prosecution could have introduced testimony as to the
defendant's statements before the justice.1S The statement of the defendant that he
wrote the check would be let in as an admission,' 6 which the defendant could have
explained." The prosecutor's burden, however, is increased if the docket itself is not
admissible; in the present case the justice of the peace could not be called, having
died pending suit in the district court.
But since the defendant's counsel did not object to the admission of the docket it
seems that the defendant waived his right to keep the plea of guilty from the jury. 8
The prejudicial effect of this evidence is not so great that an appellate court will hold
that the trial court should have excluded it on its own motion and that failure to do so
constitutes reversible error."9 That failure to exclude such evidence does not result in
an unfair trial is borne out by the fact that some courts allow the introduction of a
withdrawn plea of guilty.20
The docket, a copy of which was introduced by the state, was not signed by the
justice of the peace who heard the case. The authenticity of the copy was certified by
his successor in office, but no one certified the accuracy of the original. There being no
clerk of court, it would seem that only the presiding justice could certify that the
record faithfully represented that which actually occurred before him." Lacking such
certification, the docket was inadmissible hearsay,'2 and the copy was secondary hearsay, likewise inadmissible. But since no objection to its admission was made, the defendant waived the right to have the evidence excluded.23 Admission without objection does not constitute reversible error.24
Federal Courts-Procedure-Jurisdiction of Federal Courts to Render Declaratory
Judgments in State Tax Cases-[Federal].-The plaintiff, a taxpayer, sued in a federal district court to obtain a declaratory judgment that the Wyoming Emergency
Sales Tax Act of 1935' and Use Tax Act of 19372 were unconstitutional. The state con'5 Any person present in the justice's court could testify as to what occurred therein, and
this method of proving the defendant's statements before the justice would have given the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the witness giving the testimony.
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